We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the participation or structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that performing that case of control is computationally hard. Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter. We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest known number of control resistances among natural voting systems.
subtly alter the election to achieve his or her desired end. Thus much of the following study of voting systems has been directed toward finding the best compromises and most reasonable, if imperfect, solutions.
Electoral control represents cases where the authority conducting the election attempts to alter the outcome by changing the participation or structure of the election: modifying the sets of voters or candidates that take part or conducting culling subelections in one of several ways. The study of control of elections was initiated by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [6] , who also introduced a novel defense against it. Even if control is possible, it may be computationally very difficult to find an ideal plan. The standard tools of complexity theory can be brought to bear on the problem. In many cases, a control problem can be shown to be NP-hard and thus very unlikely to be solvable in polynomial time. We may be able to accept theoretical vulnerability to control if computational difficulty would make it impractical for a computationally limited attacker. Control is one of several classes of election manipulative action problems, which also include manipulation (strategic voting) [5] and bribery [17] .
It is important to note that NP-hardness is a worst case notion, and a problem that is NP-hard may be efficiently solvable in the average case, or in a limited, though large subdomain, or there could be efficient and acceptably effective approximation algorithms. All of these situations have occurred with election manipulative action problems. Several papers have found generally hard election manipulation problems to be easy in the average case (see [9, 31, 32] , though regarding [32] see also [13] ).
When the voter preferences are restricted to be single-peaked, many election manipulative action problems that are hard in the general case are sometimes easy on a high portion of instances [19] . Manipulation in Borda voting with at least two manipulators is known to be NP-hard [4, 10] but has a polynomial-time approximation algorithm that only ever uses one manipulator more than the minimum required [39] . Other work has studied manipulative action problems with an eye to how much work is necessary to succeed in manipulation rather than being concerned with the hardness of decision problems [38] . Approximation algorithm frameworks have been developed for manipulative action problems and algorithms exist for some problems in broad classes of voting systems (though others are inapproximable) [3] . Other work has been done to study the parametrized complexity of manipulation problems [7, 12, 27, 28] . In some cases an NP-hard manipulative action problem will admit an efficient parametrized algorithm, making the problem feasible for small parameter values. Other work has sought to identify phase transitions in parametrized problems to see when they can be easy [29, 36, 37 ]. An NP-hard control action would almost certainly be harder to implement than one that is in P, but NP-hardness alone does not fully protect a system against control.
Since the initial work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick, a number of voting systems have been studied with an eye toward computational resistance to control. Several systems have been found with a high number of resistances [14, 18, 24] , although some of them are not sufficiently natural for practical use, remain vulnerable to some of the cases of control, or have other technical flaws. The system fallback voting was found by Erdélyi et al. [12, 15, 16] to be resistant to all but two cases of control and it possesses the best known set of resistances for a natural system. Erdélyi et al. [12, 15] also found that Bucklin voting resists at least 19 of the 22 standard control cases, and it may resist as many as 20. The ranked pairs voting system was found by Parkes and Xia to be resistant to a number of cases of control, as well as to manipulation and bribery [33] . Voting systems have been developed that resist all cases of control, but at the cost of being highly unnatural [24] . Thus it is still highly desirable to search for natural and robust voting systems with high degrees of control resistance.
This paper is particularly motivated by the work of Erdélyi et al. who studied the system sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV) [14] . This system is a hybrid of approval voting and plurality, combining the different ballots used in each, and it handily combines the control resistances of both systems. It does so by adding a vote coercion step that adjusts all votes to approve of and disapprove of at least one candidate. This results in more complex behavior upon changes to the candidate set and gives the system the candidate-control resistances possessed by plurality. However this may have the effect of forcing a voter to distinguish between candidates he or she ranked evenly and assigning him or her an arbitrary new approval threshold that may not represent his or her preferences.
Range voting (RV) is a voting system with an alternate voter preference representation that allows a voter to score his or her level of approval of each candidate [35] . This is in contrast to voting systems that use the typical ranked-vote model that can only express relative order of preference. Range voting has a number of real world advocates due to its good behavior regarding conventional voting system criteria. We will also introduce a variant of range voting and show that it has among the highest known degrees of resistance to control among natural voting systems, matching the set of control resistances possessed by fallback voting. This system, normalized range voting (NRV), uses a similar vote-alteration procedure to SP-AV, but in a way that preserves the relative preferences of a voter among the candidates in the election. Fallback voting is similar to SP-AV in that it also combines an approval vote and a ranking of the candidates, but unlike SP-AV it never forces a voter to change his or her approval threshold. RV and NRV are arguably simpler and more natural voting systems than fallback voting, having a single-part ballot consisting of just a score vector over the candidates, and having a simpler, more intuitive, winner determination method consisting of just adding up votes (with an additional normalization stage in NRV) rather than the iterative method used in fallback voting. Range voting is a natural extension of approval voting, and it is the basic, obvious voting system over its vote model: The voters score the candidates, and the highest-scored candidates win. Though RV is not often used in political elections, it is quite common in other contexts, with a modified version used for scoring various Olympic sports such as gymnastics and figure skating, and with the 5-star system for rating products online essentially being a form of range voting. In these contexts and others, RV allows voters to express degrees of preference among the candidates rather than just ranking them in order of preference.
Preliminaries

Range Voting
Range voting (RV) is a voting system with an alternate voter representation that allows a voter to express his or her degree of approval of each candidate. Let S denote the cardinality of a finite set S. We will describe a k-range election as E = (C, V ) where C is the set of candidates with C = m, and V is the set of voters with V = n and for a voter v ∈ V , v ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} m . Each voter expresses his or her preferences by giving a score for each candidate. The parameter k sets the highest score a voter is allowed to give a candidate. The winners of the election are the candidates with the highest sum score across all voters.
Example
The following is an example of a 2-range election of the candidates {a, b, c}. b will be the winner with a total of 20 points.
# Voters a b c
Though range voting is also sometimes described allowing scores over a real interval such as [0, 1] [35] , this paper will deal with the more limited integral version for its practicality of implementation and to avoid issues with the size of representation. Our primary concern is to study the difficulty of decision problems relating to the system and allowing scores of unbounded size would greatly complicate that analysis. Note that any bounded size and precision real number representation would be equivalent to an integral representation, so this version will be just as expressive as a rational representation or any other which would be suitable for computational analysis.
Arrow's Theorem was formulated with the traditional voter preference models of a strict ordering. Since range voting uses a different model, it is not bound by that result and, though subject to interpretation, achieves many natural axiomatic criteria [25, 35] .
To demonstrate, we will show an example where RV satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) while a similar plurality election would violate it. IIA is satisfied in an election system if the relative ranking between two candidates is independent of the presence or ranking of other candidates. Let us formulate a 1-range election, and assume that each voter only gives any points to his or her top candidate.
# Voters a b c Ranked ballot
Candidate a wins this initial election in either election system. Now, if we remove the last place candidate c:
In the range election, the c voters are left not awarding any points to anybody, which is a perfectly legal vote, and perfectly rational, if one does feel no distinction between the candidates. Consequently the original result stands and a remains the winner. In the plurality election, the votes of third group of voters are transferred to their second choice and b becomes the new winner of the election. We can see that in RV, a change to the candidate set will never alter the performance of the still-present candidates, as the candidates are ranked independently rather than being forced into strict linear orders.
Normalized Range Voting
A rational voter seeking to maximize his or her impact in an election would always give his or her most preferred candidate the highest score possible (k) and his or her least preferred candidate the lowest score possible (0). We introduce the system normalized range voting (NRV), which captures this notion and also gives the system more interesting behavior under several types of centralized control.
In this system each voter specifies his or her preferences as in standard range voting. However, as part of the score aggregation, the system normalizes each vote to a rational in the range [0, k]. Formally, for a voter v and v's maximum and minimum scores m and n, v's score s for a candidate is changed to k(s−n) m−n . If m = n, a voter shows no preference among the candidates and this vote will not be counted. The system does not make an effort to coerce such an unconcerned vote into one that distinguishes between the candidates.
The relationship between RV and NRV is closely analogous to the relationship between approval voting and SP-AV. The normalization step ends up removing several cases of control immunity, but it introduces more complex behavior on alterations of the candidate set that gain back a greater number of control resistances.
Unlike RV, NRV unambiguously fails the criteria independence of irrelevant alternatives. Consider a 2-NRV election with C = {a, b, c} and V below. The candidate a will win this election with a score of 14, with 12 and 8 for candidates b and c. However, consider the election with the same voters but with the candidate c removed. At first, a appears to still be winning the election. However the normalization step will scale up the votes from the third group of voters to give b 16 points in total, making b the winner of the election.
While this seems to be a negative against this system, this complex, shifting behavior on the changing of the candidates is exactly what allows us to achieve a large number of control resistances for NRV over RV.
Control
Control represents the efforts of a centralized authority, the chair of an election to alter the structure of the election in order to affect its outcome. This involves changing either the candidate or voter sets or partitioning either and conducting initial subelections. In real world political elections, this corresponds to voter fraud and voter suppression, back-room dealings with potential candidates, and gerrymandering and similar manipulations. In the context of multiagent systems, it is related to any efforts by a system designer or administrator to alter the results by changing the parameters of the system. See any of [2, 18, 23] for more discussion of how these problems correspond to real-world scenarios. More formally, for the purposes of the complexity theoretic analysis of the control problems, we will analyze the cases of control in the form of decision problems. That is, we will define a problem where the goal is to find whether in a particular election a certain case of control can succeed in its goals.
The control cases, as initially introduced by Bartholdi et al. [6] , were all constructive, that is, the control is directed towards making a distinguished candidate the winner. In some cases, a malicious chair could conceivably want above all to prevent a particular candidate from winning the election, regardless of who else wins. This idea was introduced by Conitzer and Sandholm [8] as destructive manipulation and later by Hemaspaandra et al. in the context of control [23] . Though this may seem to be a less desirable goal, it may be feasible in some cases where constructive control is not and thus is it also worth studying.
The goal is to classify a voting system as susceptible and vulnerable, susceptible and resistant, or immune to each of the various cases of control, with these terms initially defined by Bartholdi et al. [6] and widely adopted since. It is helpful now to define these notions precisely.
Susceptibility A voting system is susceptible to a case of control if that action has potential to affect the result of an election. That is, for a constructive case of control, there is at least one positive instance where the distinguished candidate was not originally a winner of the election, or for a destructive case of control, there is at least one positive instance where the distinguished candidate was originally a winner.
Vulnerability A voting system is vulnerable to a case of control if it is susceptible to that case, and the associated decision problem can be solved in polynomial time; that is, it is in P. This has a very good practical correspondence with real world efficiency of the problem, and thus the case of control is computationally easy.
Resistance A voting system is resistant to a case of control if it is susceptible to that case, and the associated decision problem is NP-hard. The idea of NP-hardness has a long and storied history, but for the current purposes, it suffices to say that such problems are very unlikely to have efficient general solutions, barring a major shift in our understanding of computer science.
Immunity A voting system is immune to a case of control if that action cannot affect the result of the election. This is obviously a desirable notion but it is generally harder to come by than resistance.
Among the cases of control are control by adding or deleting either voters or candidates. In the case of adding voters or candidates, the new participants must be chosen from a set rather than arbitrarily created. For most of these cases, we include a parameter limiting how many candidates can be added or deleted, except in the case of control by adding candidates, where we also have an "unlimited" variant with no such limit. In the candidate cases, the distinguished candidate must be in the original candidate set. In the cases of destructive control by deleting candidates, the distinguished candidate cannot be among those deleted as that would trivially solve the problem.
The various cases of control by partition are not quite straightforward and deserve a little explanation. In any control by partition problem, initial subelections are performed with segments of the voter and candidate sets and a final election is performed with the candidates that survive these subelections.
In control by partition of voters, the voter set is partitioned into two subsets and subelections are run with each (with the original candidate set). The candidates that survive each subelection face off to find the final winner of the election.
Control by partition of candidates has two major variants. In one variant, control by partition, one set of candidates is separated off from the rest for an initial subelection. Whatever candidates survive this election then rejoin the rest of the candidates for the final election with the entire voter set. In the other variant, control by run-off partition, the candidate set is partitioned into two sets and each set conducts an initial subelection. The candidates that survive each of these elections then are brought together for the final election with the entire voter set.
There is an additional variation in the tiebreaking rule that is chosen in the subelections. In the case of a tie, either all of the top scoring candidates are promoted to the final election, or none of them are. These two cases are called ties-promote and ties-eliminate. Notably, in the second case, an election can fail to elect any candidate, even if the underlying system always has at least one winner. Though these may seem like subtle differences, many voting systems will resist one of the cases while being vulnerable to another.
In the computational social choice literature, various papers have alternately considered these problems under either the unique-winner or nonunique-winner models. That is, the objective of a control action is either to cause the distinguished candidate to be the only winner of an election (or not the only winner in the destructive cases), or instead to cause the distinguished candidate to become one of possibly several winners (or not a winner at all in the destructive cases). In this paper, we follow the lead of the original paper on election control [6] and use the unique-winner model. We will now formally describe the various control problems. 
Control by Adding Candidates
Given: An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C,
Control by Deleting Candidates
Given: An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, and k ∈ N. Question (Constructive): Is it possible to make w a unique winner of an election (C − C , V ) with some C ⊆ C where C ≤ k? Question (Destructive): Is it possible to make w not a unique winner of an election (C − C , V ) with some C ⊆ (C − {w}) where C ≤ k?
Control by Adding Voters
Given: An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, an additional voter set U , and k ∈ N. Question (Constructive): Is it possible to make w a unique winner of an election (C, V ∪ U ) for some U ⊆ U where U ≤ k? Question (Destructive): Is it possible to make w not a unique winner of an election (C, V ∪ U ) for some U ⊆ U where U ≤ k?
Control by Deleting Voters
Given: An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, and k ∈ N. Question (Constructive): Is it possible to make w a unique winner of an election 
Results
The control results for these two systems, as well as approval, Bucklin voting, and fallback voting for comparison, are summarized in Table 1 . "V", "R", "I", and "S" stand for vulnerable, resistant, immune, and susceptible, which are used in the standard way in the literature dating from Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [6] . "C" marks constructive control while "D" marks destructive control. "TE" denotes the ties-eliminate model and "TP" the ties-promote model. Results presented in this paper are marked in bold.
Immunity and Susceptibility Results
Before analyzing resistance, it is necessary to examine whether it is in fact possible to alter an election through a case of control, that is, whether the voting system is susceptible or immune to that case of control. Several of the control cases are linked in terms in susceptibility, as one may be the inverse of the other, or just a slightly more elaborate version. This simplifies the Table 1 Control results for approval [23] , Bucklin voting [12, 15] , fallback voting [12, 15, 16] , range voting, normalized range voting
Control by
Tie model
matter of achieving the full set of results as fewer cases actually have to be proved. Furthermore several susceptibility results follow from simple properties of a voting system. One simple property, the unique version of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (or Unique-WARP) implies several control immunities. In a voting system satisfying Unique-WARP, a unique winner among a collection of candidates must remain the winner among any subcollection of which they are a part [6] . Any voting system obeying this property will be immune to constructive control by adding candidates, constructive control by adding an unlimited number of candidates, destructive control by deleting candidates, and destructive control by partition or runoff partition of candidates in both tie handling models [23] .
Theorem 1 RV is immune to constructive control by adding candidates, constructive control by adding an unlimited number of candidates, destructive control by deleting candidates, and destructive control by partition or runoff partition of candidates.
Proof RV can easily be seen to satisfy Unique-WARP. The unique winner among a collection of candidates has the highest sum score among all the voters. In any subcollection they will still have the highest score and they will still be the winner. Thus RV achieves the listed immunities.
Theorem 2 RV is immune to constructive control by partition and runoff partition of candidates in the ties-promote model.
Proof In RV, any candidate that is in first place (possibly tied) will be in first in any subset of the candidates of which they are a part. Therefore they will survive any initial subelection in the ties-promote model. Consequently no candidate that is not already the unique winner can be made to be the unique winner through partition of candidates in this model. Hemaspaandra et al. [23] defined the notion of a voiced voting system, where an election with exactly one candidate will always result in that candidate as the winner. Every voiced voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates, destructive control by adding candidates, and destructive control by adding an unlimited number of candidates [23] . Proof RV and NRV are clearly voiced voting systems. If there is a single candidate, he or she by default has the highest sum score, so he or she will be the only winner. Thus all of these susceptibilities hold. The winner of the original election will be a. However, with candidate c deleted, the votes of the third class of voters will be normalized to allot 2 points to candidate b, and b will become the winner of the election. Therefore NRV is susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates. Susceptibility to the other cases follows from Theorem 4.1 of [23] , which states that the susceptibilities of these cases are tied together. Initially, this election has no unique winner, though candidates b and c are tied for first. However, by partitioning the candidate set into {a}, {b, c}, the outcome is different. b and c will tie in their subelection and be eliminated. If this action is interpreted as control by runoff partition, a will win their single candidate election. In either case, a is the sole remaining candidate and becomes the winner of the election.
Theorem 8 NRV is susceptible to constructive and destructive control by partition and runoff partition of candidates in both tie handling models.
Proof Consider the following 2-normalized-range election over candidates {a, b, c}.
# Voters a b c
The initial winner of this election is a. Partitioning the candidates into {a}, {b, c} will change the outcome of the election. If this action is interpreted as runoff partition a will win their initial subelection, or otherwise {a} is the remaining set of candidates. b will win their subelection and go on to win the final election over a after the scores are normalized. No ties occur so this will work in either tie handling model. We both prevent a from becoming the winner and cause b to become the winner, so NRV is susceptible to both constructive and destructive control by partition and runoff partition of candidates in both tie handling models.
Vulnerability Results
The majority of the problems to which RV or NRV are vulnerable have trivial algorithms which are only slight variations of those used for approval voting (allowing for the potentially higher scores given by voters), which can be seen in Theorems 4.22, 4.24, 4.25 and 4.26 of Hemaspaandra et al. [23] . The following problem is sufficiently different and interesting to merit detailed inclusion.
Theorem 9 k-RV is vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters in either tie handling model, for any fixed k.
Proof A dynamic programming algorithm, a variation of one used to solve PARTI-TION in pseudo-polynomial time [22] can be used to solve this problem. The idea of the algorithm is that if the distinguished candidate w is the original winner, a partition must cause w to lose to one candidate in the first partition and another candidate in the second to make them lose the election. The algorithm loops over pairs of candidates and checks if a successful partition exists for that pair of candidates.
The input will be an instance ((C, V ), w) of the control problem with C = m and V = n. We will solve the decision problem and thus output either true or false depending on whether this is a positive instance. With some modifications this algorithm could also solve the search problem and output a successful partition if one exists.
We first perform an initial check to see w is the winner, and if not return true immediately. Then perform the following procedure for every pair of candidates in C − {w}.
Given w and the two other candidates c 1 , c 2 from C, construct a (2mk + 1) × (2mk + 1) × (n + 1) three-dimensional array, with the first two indices ranging from −mk to mk and with the third index ranging from 0 to n. The cell at position (x, y, z) records whether a partition of voters (V 1 , V 2 ) can be made using the first z voters (in some fixed order) such that x is the score of c 1 in V 1 minus the score of w in V 1 , and y is the score of c 2 in V 2 minus the score of w in V 2 . The cell (0, 0, 0) will be marked as reachable and all other cells will initially be marked as unreachable. Reachable cells will also record whether this allocation came from placing the last voter in V 1 or V 2 , in order to aid in retrieving the actual allocation. A successful partition of the voters will exist causing w to lose the election if there is some reachable cell at an index (x, y, n) where x, y > 0 in the ties-promote model, or x, y ≥ 0 in the ties-eliminate model.
The array can be filled in as follows. Given a reachable cell (x, y, z), fill in cell (x + d 1 , y, z + 1) with (T , 1), denoting that that cell is reachable with voter z + 1 placed in V 1 , where d 1 is the difference of the scores of c 1 and w according to voter z + 1. Fill in cell (x, y + d 2 , z + 1) with (T , 2), denoting that that cell is reachable with voter z + 1 placed in V 2 , where d 2 is the difference of the scores of c 2 and w according to voter z + 1. Also, do not rewrite over the contents of a cell if it has already been marked.
By proceeding in this way all reachable partitions will eventually be marked and a successful partition, if it exists, can be derived from working backwards down the table from the cell at the top level by checking the contents of the cell and the preferences of the appropriate voter. If a successful partition is found for this pair of candidates, exit and return true. Otherwise continue through to the next pair of candidates, eventually returning false if no successful partition is ever found. This algorithm will run in time O(m 4 k 2 n). Since k is a fixed constant and m and n are polynomial in the size of the input, the algorithm runs in polynomial time. Therefore RV is vulnerable to these control problems.
Generalization of Resistance Results to Other Scoring Ranges
Range voting and normalized range voting are both parametrized voting systems, with a bound k giving the largest allowed score to be given to a candidate. This bound is a parameter for the voting system, with 2-NRV being a separate system, with a separate ballot domain and a separate winner determination method, from 10-NRV. The resistance proofs here will refer to specific RV and NRV elections with particular scoring ranges. However we want to be able to show resistance for other scoring ranges, and show that all the resistances we show will hold for some particular scoring range.
Theorem 10
If RV or NRV exhibits resistance to a case of control for a particular scoring range k, it will exhibit that resistance for any range ak with a ∈ N + .
Proof We can reduce an instance of any RV or NRV control problem for an election with a scoring range k to an instance of the same problem with an election with a scoring range of ak for any a ∈ N + . We can do this simply by scaling all of the scores in all of the votes in the original election up by a factor of a. This new election with the new scoring bound and new votes will behave the same as the original election before any control attempt, and it will also behave the same under any control attempt or manipulative action, as all of the votes and the sum scores will be scaled up by the same factor a. In the case of NRV, any normalization that occurs in the original election will occur in the newly scaled election to the same degree, but just with the pre and post normalization scores both being scaled up by the factor of a. Thus the winner in the scaled election will be the same before and after any control action and control problems easily reduce to same problem in the scaled voting system.
Results Derived from Approval
Due to RV's great similarity with approval voting, many results relating to approval voting trivially apply to RV and NRV.
Theorem 11 If approval voting is resistant to a case of control, RV and NRV will also be resistant for any scoring range.
Proof This is easy to show. We can reduce from an instance of any approval control problem by simply considering the election a 1-range election or a 1-normalizedrange election. A 1-range election is exactly equivalent so this will trivially work. For the NRV election, though it does technically include the normalization step which can modify the election, when the score range is 1, no normalization is actually performed, so again this election is equivalent to the original approval election. These results will also generalize to k-RV and k-NRV for any k ≥ 1 as previously described.
Theorem 12 1-RV and 1-NRV are resistant to the following cases of control: constructive control by adding voters, constructive control by deleting voters, and constructive control by the partition of voters in the ties-promote and ties-eliminate models.
All of these resistances are derived from reductions from approval as described above, and the fact that approval is resistant to these cases of control [23] .
Control by Adding or Deleting Candidates
Theorem 13 2-NRV is resistant to constructive control and destructive control by adding candidates, constructive and destructive control by adding an unlimited number of candidates, and destructive control by deleting candidates.
Proof This proof is inspired by a similar proof relating in SP-AV by Erdélyi, Nowak, and Rothe [14] .
We will reduce from an instance of the hitting set problem, known to be NPcomplete and defined as follows [22] .
Given: A collection S of subsets of a set B, j ∈ N + . Question: Does B contain a hitting set B of size j or less that contains at least one element from every S ∈ S?
Given a hitting set instance (B, S, j) with B = n and S = m we will construct a 2-range election. The candidate set C will consist of B ∪ {c, w}. The idea is that c will win the election unless only a hitting set of size j of candidates from B are included. The voter set V will be as follows: This will lead to scores in ({c, w}, V ) as follows:
Candidate Score
The candidate c will win with a margin of 2m(j
Additionally the scores in ({c, w} ∪ B, V ) will be as follows:
Here, c will win with a margin of 4n − 4j − 2, which will be positive as long as j < n.
We will show that w will be the winner of ({c, w} ∪ B , V ) with B ⊆ B if B corresponds to a hitting set of size ≤ j . The candidate w loses 4 points for each b ∈ B included, of which there are no more than j . c loses 2(j + 1) points for each S i hit. There will be m such sets if B is a hitting set, so c loses 2m(j + 1) points total.
The candidate w will end up with an advantage of at least 2 points and thus w will be the winner of the election.
We will show that w will not be the winner of any election ({c, w} ∪ B , V ) where B does not correspond to a hitting set of size ≤ j . If B is a hitting set but B > j, c will have 6m(j + 1) + 8n points and w will have ≤ 6m(j + 1) + 8n. If B is not a hitting set c will have ≥ 6m(j + 1) + 8n + 2j + 2 points and w will have ≤ 6m(j + 1) + 8n + 2j + 2 points. In either case w will not be a unique winner. This construction can be used to create cases of constructive and destructive control by adding candidates (also in the unlimited case) and destructive control by deleting candidates. ((C, V ) , (m−j), c) is such an instance of destructive control by deleting candidates. (({c, w}, V ) , B, j, w) is an instance of constructive control by adding candidates, and (({c, w}, V ) , B, j, c) is an instance of destructive control by adding candidates. (({c, w}, V ), B, w) and (({c, w}, V ) , B, c) are appropriate instances of constructive and destructive control by adding an unlimited number of candidates.
Theorem 14 2-NRV is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates.
As in Erdélyi, Nowak, and Rothe [14] , the previous reduction is not sufficient to show resistance to constructive control by deleting candidates, as c and w are the only candidates with a shot at winning. Deleting c will instantly make w the winner. The remaining case can be handled by the following reduction.
Proof As in the proof of the previous theorem, we reduce from an instance of hitting set (B, S, j) where B = n and S = m. We will assume that 0 < j < n, as if j = 0 we trivially have a negative instance, and if j = n we have a positive one.
The candidate set C will consist of B ∪ {w}, the set B from the instance of hitting set together with an additional candidate.
The voter set V will be constructed as follows:
-2n − j voters have a score of 2 for b for every b ∈ B, and a score of 0 for w; -2mj + 3 voters have a score of 2 for w and a score of 0 for all other candidates; -For each S ∈ S, 4j voters have a score of 2 for s for every s ∈ S, a score of 1 for each candidate in B − S, and a score of 0 for w; -For each S ∈ S, 4j voters have a score of 2 for b for every b ∈ B − S, a score of 2 for w, and a score of 1 for s for every s ∈ S; -For each b ∈ B, 2 voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for w, and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
We can show that if B is a hitting set of size j , w will be the winner of the election (B ∪ {w}, V ). Assume B is a hitting set and B = j . Each b ∈ B will receive 12mj + 4n − 2j + 4 points. w will receive 8mj + 6 + 4mj + 4(n − j) + 2j = 12mj + 4n − 2j + 6 points. Thus w will be the unique winner in the election.
We can show that if B is not a hitting set or if B > j, w will not be the winner of the election (B ∪ {w}, V ). First assume B is a hitting set but B = l > j. Since B is a hitting set, every b ∈ B will receive exactly 12mj + 4n − 2j + 4 points. w will receive 4mj + 6 + 8mj + 4(n − l) + 2l = 12mj + 4n − 2l + 6 points. score(b) − score(w) = −2j + 2l − 2 which is non-negative since l > j. Thus w will not be a unique winner of the election..
Next consider the case where B = l ≤ j but B is not a hitting set. Thus every b ∈ B will have a score ≥ 12nj + 4n + 2j + 4 as each will gain an extra 4j points from one set of group 3 voters. w will have the score 12nj + 4n − 2l + 6. Thus score(b) − score(w) = 2j + 2l − 2 which is non-negative and w will again lose the election.
An instance of hitting set (B, S, j) can thus be reduced to finding whether w can be made the winner of (C, V ) as above by deleting m − j candidates.
Destructive Control by Partition of Voters
Theorem 15 2-NRV is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters in the ties-promote model.
Proof We will reduce from restricted hitting set. Restricted hitting set is an NPcomplete hitting set variant introduced by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe with additional restrictions on the sizes of the sets in an instance [23] . The version as used here has a slightly stronger bound that is necessary due to the somewhat larger numbers required in this proof.
Given: A collection S of subsets of a set B, j ∈ N + , with S = m, B = n, and the additional restriction that m(j + 1) + 3 ≤ n − j . Question: Does B contain a hitting set B of size j or less that contains at least one element from every S ∈ S?
Given an instance of restricted hitting set (B, S, j) with B = n and S = m, create a 2-normalized-range election with C = B ∪ {w, c} and V as follows. The candidate c can be made not a unique winner of (C, V ) through partition of voters if and only if there is a hitting set of size ≤ j over S in B.
We can show that if there is a hitting set of size ≤ j , it is possible to cause c to lose the election through partition of voters. Given an appropriate hitting set B , partition V into sets V 1 and V 2 . Let V 1 contain a voter from the final group corresponding to every b ∈ B and one voter from the second group (allotting just 2 points to w) and let V 2 = V − V 1 . After the initial subelections, we will be left with w, c, and the candidates B corresponding to the hitting set, and w will win this election.
If there is no hitting set B ∈ B of size ≤ j , c cannot be made to lose the election through partition of voters. For any actions attempting to control the election by forcing the final candidate set, see the previous reduction to adding/deleting candidates.
As for other efforts concentrated at more typically partitioning the voters, among the initial candidates, c has as high of a score as any two other candidates, so c must at least tie in at least one of the subelections. Thus he or she will always make it to the final election. The scores of the candidates in the initial election follow.
c's score minus the next two highest scores will thus be at least 4(n − j) − 4m(j + 1) − 10. However, due to our use of restricted hitting set, we have that m(j + 1) + 3 ≤ n − j , and so this is at least 2. Thus the only way to defeat c is to face them against a hitting set of candidates as described.
Theorem 16 4-NRV is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters in the ties-eliminate model.
We will reduce from the Exact Cover by Three-sets problem (X3C), defined as follows.
Given: A set B = {b 1 , . . . , b 3j } and a family S = {S 1 , . . . , S n } of sets of size three of elements from B. Question: Is it possible to select j sets from S such that their union is exactly B?
Proof Given a X3C instance (B, S) we will construct a 2-range election (C, V ) as follows. The candidate set will be B ∪ {c, w}, where c will be the distinguished candidate. The voters set V will consist of the following: -For every S i ∈ S, one voter with a score of 4 for every candidate in B − S i , a score of 2 for c, and a score of 0 for every other candidate; -2n voters with a score of 4 for every candidate in B, a score of 2 for c, and a score of 0 for w; -j − 1 voters with a score of 4 for w, a score of 2 for c, and a score of 0 for all other candidates; -For every b ∈ B, 1 voter with a score of 4 for b, a score of 1 for every candidate in B − {b}, a score of 1 for c, and a score of 0 for w; -2j +3n+1 voters with a score of 4 for w and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
We will assume that 1 ≤ j ≤ n and that each element in B is in at least one set from S.
If there is an exact cover over B, then w can be made to lose the election through partition of voters in the ties-eliminate model. Consider the partition of the voter set into V 1 , V 2 , where V 1 consists of the voters from the first group corresponding to the elements of the set cover together with the third group of voters, and where
The candidate w will win the subelection (C, V 2 ) and the distinguished candidate c will easily win the subelection (C, V 1 ). c will receive 2j points from the cover voters and 2j − 2 points from the other voters for a total of 4j − 2 points. For the B candidates, each will receive 4 points from each of the first-group voters except the one that corresponds to the set that covers them, coming to 4j − 4 points in total. w will gain 4 points from each of the j − 1 voters that favors them, and so he or she will gain 4j − 4 votes in total. Therefore c will win this subelection and will go on to face w in the final election.
In the final election, with almost all of the candidates eliminated, vote normalization will occur benefiting c to the point that he or she gains the advantage. All of the votes in the first, second, and fourth groups will now give four points to c, giving them 12n + 14j − 2 points in total. This is at least as many as the 12n + 12j points w was given, and so w will no longer be the unique winner.
If there is no exact cover, w cannot be made to lose the election through partition of voters in the ties-eliminate model. This is due to several facts: w will win at least one of the two subelections, c cannot win either subelection, and w will win head to head against all candidates that it may face in the final election.
c cannot win an initial subelection except as previously described. No voter prefers them outright, so the only way to make them win is to balance the points he or she gains from the first group of voters and from the third group of voters and to give him or her an advantage over each B candidate by covering that candidate with a voter that prefers c. None of the other voters will help c win a subelection, as no others help c gain points relative to the B candidates. If a set of first group voters smaller than j that is not a cover is chosen, then at least one B candidate will gain points for every one of these voters. We will then not be able to boost c over the B candidates without giving too many points to w. If a cover larger than j of voters is chosen, then there will not be enough third group voters to include to boost c over the B voters and c will not be able to win.
The candidate w must win at least one of the initial subelections and make it to the final election. With the original candidate set and unnormalized scores, w has a considerable advantage in points over all other candidates, and since it is largely the same voters that support all of the other candidates, there is no way to partition the voters to make w lose both subelections.
Against all candidates but c, w will win a head to head contest in the final election. In a head-to-head contest with w the other candidates gain about as many points as c through normalization, but they will still have fewer points total as each B candidate loses out on 4 points for every subset S i they are a part of. The B candidate will thus have no more than 12n + 12j − 4 votes, while w will have 12n + 12j votes and will be the winner.
Therefore w will win the final election for all partitions in the case that there is not an exact cover over the set B.
Control by Partition of Candidates
Theorem 17 4-NRV is resistant to constructive control by partition and runoff partition of candidates in both the ties-promote and ties-eliminate models.
We will reduce from control by deletion of candidates in NRV. We will show the reduction to constructive control by run-off partition, though the other partition case is quite similar.
Proof Given an k-NRV election 1 (C, V ) with C = m and V = n the distinguished candidate w ∈ C, and a deletion limit j ∈ N, construct a 2k-NRV election (C , V ) as follows. C = C ∪ {a, b}, where a and b are additional auxiliary candidates. V will consist of the original voter set V in addition to the following voters.
-For each c ∈ C, 2n voters have a score of 2k for c, a score of k for a, and a score of 0 for every other candidate; -For each c ∈ C * , 3nm voters have a score of 2k for c and a score of 0 for every other candidate; -2nm voters have a score of 2k for w, a score of k for a, and a score of 0 for every other candidate; -nm voters have a score of 2k for w and a score of 0 for every other candidate; -(m − j − 1)n voters have a score of 2k for all c ∈ C and a score of 0 for every other candidate; -2n + 1 voters have a score of 2k for a and a score of 0 for every other candidate; -3n + 3nm + (m − j − 1)n + 2 voters have a score of 2k for b and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
Let s 0 (c) be the score of candidate c among the original voters V . Note for any candidate s 0 (c) ≤ nk.
We can show that if w can be made the winner of (C, V ) by deleting ≤ j candidates, w can be made the winner of (C , V ) through control by runoff partition of candidates. Suppose w can be made the winner of (C, V ) through deleting l ≤ j candidates. Let D be the set of candidates which were deleted in the deletion problem. Partition the candidates into the subelections (D ∪ {a, b}, V ) and (C − D, V ). a will win the first subelection as the scores will be the following.
w will win the second subelection, as it must if it is capable of winning with the candidates in D deleted. The final election will then come down to w and a, and w will come out the victor as the scores will be the following.
Alternately, in the non-runoff partition case, let the initial subelection be (D ∪ {a, b}, V ), which a will win. The final election will come down to ({a, w} ∪ C − D, V ), which w will win.
We can show that if w can be made the winner of (C , V ) through control by runoff partition of candidates, w can be made the winner of (C, V ) by deleting ≤j candidates. Suppose w can be made the winner of the election (C , V ) through control by runoff partition of candidates. It must be that this occurs through a partition of the form ({a.b} ∪ D, {w} ∪ (C * − D)) with D ⊆ C * , D ≤ j . b will always beat w, so they cannot face each other in either the initial or final elections. The only candidate capable of beating b is a when not in an election with w and when accompanied by no more than j other candidates from C. w must also be able to defeat the remaining m − j candidates from the initial election. Consequently w can also be made the unique winner of (C, V ) by deleting j candidates.
The preceding construction shows that NRV is resistant to constructive cases of partition of candidates. However it is not sufficient for the destructive cases, as a winning candidate in the original election (C, V ) will not actually win in (C , V ) . Thus we will present a different construction to handle the destructive cases.
Theorem 18 2-NRV is resistant to destructive control by partition and runoff partition of candidates in both the ties-promote and ties-eliminate models.
Proof We can reduce the hitting set problem to the problem of destructive control by partition of candidates. Let (B, S, j) be an instance of hitting set where B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n }, S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m }, S i ⊆ B, and j ∈ N + , j ≤ n.
We will construct a 2-range election based on this instance. The candidate set C will consist of B ∪ {w}. The voter set V will be as follows. There is a hitting set B ⊆ B where B ≤ j if and only if w can be made to lose the election through partition or run-off partition of candidates.
If there is a hitting set B ⊆ B of size l ≤ j , w can be made to lose the election through control by partition or runoff partition of candidates with the partitions {w} ∪ B , B − B . w will lose the initial subelection ({w} ∪ B ) and thus not proceed to the final election as the scores will be the following. The one special case is when j = n, where w will lose the original election but in this case there is a trivially always a hitting set, so the mapped-from instance will be always positive as well. In any other case w will win against any subset of B, so w will win both any initial subelection and the final election, and so there is no partition to make them lose.
Conclusions
This work leaves open a number of questions. NRV still falls short of resistance to some cases of control, so some other natural system could still best it. The system Bucklin voting matches resistance with NRV in every closed case, and seems likely to hold resistance in the one open case, so this may be another system tying NRV and fallback for resistance [15] . Just as useful would be results about the conditions that are required for a voting system to have various resistances. It may still be that natural systems are incapable of having every control resistance simultaneously. Any useful results here would first require a formalization of what exactly a natural voting system is. Most desirable would be a reasonable set of conditions that could be shown to be incompatible with holding all resistances simultaneously, à la Arrow's Theorem.
Other useful work would be to analyze methods for sidestepping the worst-case difficulty of the control problems here. One example is the use of approximation algorithms as studied by Brelsford et al. [3] , analysis of the problems with a restricted preference-ensemble model [19] , or parametrized analysis of the hard control problems discussed here. It is important to note that the worst-case analysis performed here does not provide a guarantee that the problems will be hard on average. Still, this work provides more understanding of the behavior of these systems, RV and NRV, with respect to control.
